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Brietzke: Tony Honoré, Sex Law

BOOK REVIEW
SEX LAW
By Tony Honor6. London: Duckworth, Ltd., 1978. Pp. 180.
As the topic stimulates a fair amount of interest among social
scientists and as it is explored by one of the most thoughtful and
entertaining of legal academics, this book could hardly fail to please.
Yet, in several rather subtle ways, this generally excellent study
misses its aim: niggling doubts arise with regard to the author's
methodology and the book's content and conclusions. Tony
HonorC--Anthony in his more formal days-is Regius Professor of
Civil Law at Oxford, and we therefore approach his book with the
expectation of a sophisticated comparative treatment of some very
thorny problems, as in his essay on the concept of ownership in the
Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence.' These expectations are largely unsatisfied, although the book is successful as an interdisciplinary
survey-a new tack in HonorC's scholarship.
The titles of his chapters are: Marriage, Living Together,
Women as Victims, Sex for a Living, Offenders and Trials, and
Trends, Rights and Limits. They show that Honor6's analyses attempt to span such traditional legal divides as family law, criminal
law and procedure, criminology, sociology of law, jurisprudence and
constitutional law. The chapter headings also illustrate a penchant
for catchy or self-consciously avant garde phrases which are often
effective but occasionally mar the analysis. For example, a definition
of marriage as a "restrictive practice" with regard to sexual competitions' contains a useful insight, while the contention that
"women are not expected to take rape lying down"' may be offensive and adds little to the general proposition that victims of crime
are expected to complain at the first reasonable opportunity.
The breadth of coverage in what is a short book (compared to
other legal texts covering only a portion of the field) is justified in
two separate ways. "For laymen," Honor6 argues initially, "sexual
experience is an aspect of life which possesses a certain unity," as
1. Honore,

Oumership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107 (A. Guest ed.

1961).
2. T.
3.
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9 (1978).

Id at 153.
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"itches and urges" which "have to be expressed or controlled."' On
the contrary, we would have thought, many "laymen" regard their
sexual experiences as isolated, fragmented, private, intensely personal and thus immune to generalization and systematic social control. Fortunately, Honor's second justification, which only emerges
clearly during the course of his analysis, is more successful. It is
that, while there are many inconsistencies and absurdities to be
found in sex laws, the rules as a whole serve to implement a fairly
consistent set of policies. This argument is carefully qualified: "No
one moral theory has a monopoly of the law, which is a patchwork..."';
and lawyers and legislators must exercise caution in order not to
pitch the required standard of behavior too high or to enforce rules
which lack a "reasonable aim."' Even so, and while "the aims of
traditional sexual morality are not spelled out [,J they will be found
for the most part to consist in a desire to promote population
growth, marriage or production."'
This assertion presupposes the contradiction in terms of a selfconscious or goal-oriented tradition. Honors fails to discuss those
factors which account in large measure for the perpetuation of traditions: irrationalities, religious and philosophical preferences
unrelated to the objectives he enumerates, and societal inertia. His
detailed analyses of "the underlying themes and aims of that
Western sexual morality which underlies much of our sex law"8 and
which is currently in a state of flux are useful nonetheless, once the
limitations inherent in his approach are understood. Honorc's
"Western sexual morality" turns out to be an overwhelmingly
English conception, an illustration, perhaps, of attitudes encompassed
by the famous London Telegraph headline: "Fog in the [English]
Channel; Continent Isolated." The mores of "primitive" communities
are mentioned briefly for purposes of contrast, and general discussions of German and American laws and sexual attitudes are offered. There is, however, a conspicuous absence of analyses of the
laws and values associated with Mediterranean Catholicism
(especially those of France and Italy, countries which whet the appetite of conventional comparativists) and with the peculiarities
found in particular American states.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Id
Id
Id
Id
Id

at 1.
at 4.
at5.
at3.
at 2.
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Honor6 does note that, as under Roman law, a "promiscuous"
woman is regarded as a prostitute in Utah, even though -unlike the
English "common" prostitute-she does not offer her body for
reward to an indefinite number of clients. Beyond this, numerous
American divergences which would have added more flesh and blood
to his comparative analyses and served as minor qualifications on
his conclusions are ignored. While arguing that contracts of marriage and cohabitation are too inflexible to keep up with changes in
the facts of social life, Honor6 notes in passing that "there is no
great difference between US [sic] and English law on these
matters."9 Surely it is a mistake to assume that the administration
of "US" laws or, for that matter, the facts of American social life
display a monolithic uniformity with regard to adultery, divorce and
cohabitation. The people and courts of Marin County, California are
not those of (say) a county in rural Indiana nor should they be, at
least under the pluralist theories so admired by the majority of
American political scientists. In his analysis of marriage, Honor6 admits to using "American writing and case law when it is more explicit than, but not substantially different from, the English."'" This
is just the kind of selective and self-serving search for materials
which Honor6, the thoroughgoing comparativist, would presumably
condemn.
These qualifications apart, American academics will find
Honor's analyses thoughtful and provocative because there is, of
course, much common ground in English and American sexual orientations. Three "themes and aims of Western sexual morality" are
identified: the maintenance and increase of our numbers by prohibiting forms of sex through which children are not conceived; the
strengthening of the family for purposes of child rearing and
because it "gives society its main structure";" and the ascetic argument, "quite prominent in religious thinking," that sexual activity
ought to be reduced to a minimum.' 2 The latter strand merges with
another one, which is "specially prominent in protestant Christianity
and Marxism": sexual indulgence ought to be repressed "because it
interferes with the production of material things."'3 Arguably, this
statement should have been qualified still further. Recent
developments have cast doubt on the wisdom of these three aims, as
Honor6 notes: the growing economic emancipation of women in in9. Id. at 50.
10. Id. at 37 n.6.
11. Id. at 2.
12. Id at 3.
13. Id. at 3.
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dustrial societies has reduced the need for the lifelong support of
women that has constituted a major rationale of the family; and
more effective contraceptive methods, applied in the face of the
material desires of individuals and world overpopulation, have
lessened the perceived need for large families.
Thus far, the book presents a generally accurate-and not
altogether original- analysis. This writer parts company with
Honor6, however, when he moves on to discuss two "ideas which
have some influence on present-day thinking" and which are opposed
to traditional aims." One is the advocacy of utilitarian principles in
order to "increase pleasure-either the pleasures of the majority or
the minimum pleasures of all."" At what point will the liberty of the
"majority" be sacrificed in order to promote the equality "of all" in
this and other areas of social life where liberty and equality inevitably conflict? What amounts to "pleasure" is far from clear: does
it arise from sexual self-determination as Honor6 argues, or from
within societies which attempt to repress individual pleasureseeking in order to promote some projected general welfare?
Answers to these two questions are likely to be complex and messy,
involving numerous tradeoffs between the stark contrasts offered
by Honor6. His only example of a "Benthamite argument" is rather
strained: prostitutes are among the most socially productive and
even the most moral of community members, promoting the greatest
pleasure for the greatest number and, on balance, keeping families
together. "If productivity is a sign of economic health, why not sexual productivity?"'" These are only a few of the relevant factors in
what amounts to a complex calculus of the desirability of prostitution, and one outcome of this kind of subjective calculating is that
utilitarianism commands much less respect today than Honorc would
have us believe.
He does add that "far more weighty in Western societies today
is the idea of human rights, especially the right of each human being
to express and develop his or her own personality."" Even while we
await the maturation of the (dubious) fruits of President Carter's
human rights policies, it is difficult to detect much movement on the
sexual rights front. True, HonorC notes that the German courts and
Bundestag have recognized certain sexual 'rights' - the Dutch experience, which he ignores, is much more instructive in this
14.
15.
16.
17.
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regard-but he goes too far when basing the genesis of an American
right of sexual self-expression on the isolated Griswold v. Connecticut.18 Further, he seems to ignore the practicalities involved in
"taking rights seriously": "a positive right to sexual freedom . . .
must be based on a legal text or on the fact that we live in society
and have wants which may conflict with the wants of others.' '
Assuming that Honori used the disjunctive "or" intentionally, we
can only conclude that these rights are precarious in his latter formulation, resting as they do on a consensus tolerance which can
evaporate quickly-as in present-day England.
Honor6's threshold assumptions have been discussed in detail
here because they invariably dictate the course of his subsequent
descriptions and analysis. His catalog of legal rules is, in keeping
with the length and tone of the book, a brief and painless introduction to a potentially vast subject matter. Much new and relevant
social science research is also summarized briefly and, if the few
citations checked are representative, accurately. Honore avoids the
pitfall found in many socio-legal studies, that of failing to integrate
the insights gleaned from several disciplines. One shortcoming could
have been remedied with ease, however, given the accessibility of
many excellent studies about political pressure groups in Britain.
The roles played by various groups in maintaining or changing laws
concerning sex form a vital link between substantive legal content,
policing and sentencing practices, and the values subscribed to by
politically significant segments of the community. The militancy of
many groups-the (pro-) Paedophile's Information Exchange and the
reactions to it provide the most recent examples-also suggests that
predictions of an emerging English sexual consensus are premature.
In the book, marriage is viewed as a "domestic partnership"
contract, in which "standard terms" cannot be altered, one party can
dissolve the contract without the consent of the other, and the contract can be set aside for "fundamental breach." Sexual duties
within marriage are defined to include the creation of a "mutually
tolerable" sex life, in addition to the more familiar duties of consummation and faithfulness. Cohabitation contracts are also treated as
species of domestic partnerships, concerned with housing, furnishings, expenses, chores and, in some instances, child rearing. The
enforceability of these agreements, a question which will increasingly
come to concern legal practitioners, is explored in detail, while the
grounds on which a court might imply an agreement are neglected.
18.

19.

381 U.S. 479 (1965).
T. HONORfE, SEX LAW 172 (1978).
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Honor6 then distinguishes between his domestic partnerships: "so
long as marriage is the central institution of our society it will be
necessary to have some differential between married and unmarried
couples. But it need not be a wide one."' This is a useful perspective to adopt, for the legal polar opposites -marriage and nonmarriage-will undoubtedly continue to converge.
While Honor 's discussions of marriage, cohabitation and the
causes and effects of sex crimes contain much material that will be
new to most readers, his legal analyses of sex crimes are fairly conventional. A few new points are made, however, and old points are
made in effective new ways. Incest is treated as an abuse of authority,
and this highlights what Honore terms the "mysterious" prohibition
of sex relations between brother and sister. The crime of bestiality
is considered to be an anomaly, since it does not endanger the position of wives or families (or, presumably, husbands). Objections to
homosexuality are traced to their origins in the Old Testament: the
Israelites viewed it as treasonous (retarding population growth), and
the term "buggery" derives from a Bulgarian word meaning a
religious heresy.
These and other considerations lead Honors to conclude that
homosexuality is not merely a matter of taste, deviance or breaking
rules, but of a dissent akin to religious or political dissent, a failure
to acquire or a rejection of a set of orthodox and conformist feelings.
As a result, he argues, many of the so-called crimes against nature
should be abolished; "natural" should mean conformity to the individual's nature or makeup.
The chapter on prostitution is of particular interest, if only
because this is a rarely-surveyed legal topic. After considering a
brief history of prostitution, Honor6 argues that, where prostitution
itself is not criminalized, ancillary activities such as pimping, running a brothel, etc., ought not to be penalized: "The law is not to be
used to stamp it out by creating a void round the prostitute in
which no one can deal with her." 1 Reforms are needed so that prostitutes can be treated as normal members of society who practice a
profession of which many disapprove, like the army or the liquor
business. Nevertheless, the state ought not to regulate prostitution,
even though overcharging and the spread of disease may result: prostitution usually entails breaches of a duty owed by husbands to
wives, and the state should not "encourage" these breaches. This
20. Id. at 51.
21. Id. at 128.
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argument seems to rest on a fallacy, under which the state
necessarily approves of or even encourages those things which it
regulates; in any event, Honor6 neglects the defense of his value
preferences.
The state purports to reflect certain characteristic differences
between the sexes in its legal classifications of offenses,
punishments, rights and duties. Throughout his study, Honor6
reflects on these classifications to interesting effect, finding a trend
towards a greater equality between the sexes and, at the same time,
towards a greater measure of violence in sexual relations. A careful
examination of the statistics shows that, while Englishmen continue
to be significantly more "aggressive, daring and violent" than
Englishwomen, the gap between them-measured in terms of convictions for "violent" and other "serious" crimes-has closed
markedly from 1960 to 1975.' Discriminatory sentencing patterns
seem to favor women, however. Of the men arrested for sex offenses
in 1975, 34% were cautioned and released while 66% were found
guilty. The corresponding figures for women were 61% and 39%.23
Interestingly, the legalization in England (but not in Scotland or
Northern Ireland) of sex relations between consenting homosexual
adults in private has not led to a reduction in the number of convictions. Women are viewed as victims of crime inadequately protected
under law. For example, Honort (like most other commentators) is
critical of the requirement imposed by Morga. 24 a rape conviction
requires proof that the man either knew that the woman did not
consent or was indifferent to her consent.
This book reviews carefully the arguments that marriage is
one-sided -favoring the husband or the wife, depending on the
argument-or that the marital bond is too difficult to dissolve and
requires too exclusive a commitment to one person. Some interesting facts emerge during the course of these analyses: Red5
path"
requires an English wife who has sex with a man not her husband to rebut the imputation of adultery by proving that she did not
consent, while a 1963 New Zealand statute (the only example
Honore draws from this legally-innovative but socially-conservative
country) allows the woman to set aside the marriage if her husband
had impregnated another at the time of marriage..
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id at 53-4, 170.
Id at 156.
Morgan (1976) A.C. 182.
Redpath (1950) 1 All E.R. 600.
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Homosexuals cannot live together "as man and wife" in the
eyes of the law, and they are thus unable to take advantage of the
constructive trusts and implied contracts which Lord Denning is
inventing to implement property settlements for the benefit of
cohabiting heterosexuals. There seems to be little reason for this
rule, which is not commented upon by Honor6. He tacitly defends
other discriminations by classification: marital rights of support and
tax relief, the adoption of children and additional social security
benefits are denied to homosexual couples. These differentials,
Honor( argues, reasonably reflect the fact that heterosexual family
life imposes special financial burdens and that heterosexual wives
are entitled to special rights and privileges because of their
childbearing potential. It is difficult to see how these justifications
apply to the adoption of children, however, and adoption by
homosexual couples would result in the familial financial burdens he
discusses.
Sex acts between lesbians "are either not criminal or, if they
are, are seldom prosecuted."' Rape (but not, e.g., aiding and abetting) can only be committed by a man and against a woman, while a
prostitute can only be a woman; parallel offenses, however, do exist
for the opposite sex, including those which Honort includes within
the hypothetical crime of "badgering." In general, Honor6 succeeds
in his attempts to make sense of these and other discriminations,
while reserving his harshest criticisms for sentencing anomalies and
for the unsuccessful but highly dangerous types of "therapy" administered to sex offenders, many of whom display a stubborn
recidivism. These discussions are quite good, except that he takes
no account of the ideas of the "new wave" of English criminologists
concerning "labelling" in deviancy theory. Honor6 strenuously attempts a non-sexist analysis of sex and, apart from occasional lapses,
this attempt succeeds.
Like other reviews, this one has focused on the reviewer's
criticisms and, in trying to balance it out, it should be reiterated
that Honor!'s attempt to strike out in new directions of legal
analysis is admirable. Having said this, it should be noted that
Honore's conclusion epitomizes much of the impracticality and just
plain sloppiness found at many junctures in the book: "Just as nations like Scotland or Quebec have the right to settle their own
destiny . . . . so people of a certain maturity have on this view the
right to decide for themselves what form of sex, if any, they want
26.

T. HONORk, SEX LAW 89 (1978).
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and with whom they want it."' This grand analogy is particularly
fragile- self-determination by "nations" and individuals have little
in common-and it is constructed of unsupported value judgments of
a most contentious order. Reasonable persons would be perfectly
justified in rejecting either or both limbs of Honore's argument. In
particular, Prime Ministers Callaghan and Trudeau, a Puritan on the
Labour benches and the husband of a public advocate of sexual selfdetermination, would have little sympathy for an analogy based on
self-determination for Scotland and Quebec. These are the kinds of
men who exercise an immense influence over their countries' laws.
How, then, could Honor 's "right," that "each of us may use his
body as he pleases provided he or she she [sic] does not touch
another without their consent,""u ever come into being?
Paul H. Brietzke

27.
28.

Id at 173.
Id at 174.
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